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THE STRUCTURE OF THE SIEVE:
POLITICAL ECONOMY
IN THE EXPLANATION OF
TAX SYSTEMS AND TAX REFORM
STANLEY L. WINER** AND WALTER HETrICH***
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past two decades, economists have made much
progress in understanding how individuals and private markets
respond to taxation. There has not been a similar advance, however,
in the explanation of tax systems and tax reform. As Atkinson and
Stiglitz point out in the concluding paragraph of their well-known
collection of lectures on optimal taxation, "government behavior -
and the wider political structure - must be taken into account in any
realistic assessment of the prospects for [tax] reform. In this 'return
to political economy,' a great deal remains to be done."1
There is a tendency among economists to think of political
analysis as an additional step, to be taken only after economic
analysis has already been completed. We argue in this paper that
a meaningful 'return to political economy' requires a more basic
o Copyright, 1988, Stanley Winer and Walter Hettich
**School of Public Administration, Carleton University.
***California State University, Fullerton.
1 AB. Atkinson & J.E. Stiglitz, Lectures on Public Economics (Maidenhead, Eng.:
McGraw-Hill, 1980) at 576.
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change in approach. The theoretical framework must be revised and
broadened to make political as well as economic behaviour
endogenous.
Fifty years ago, Henry Simons spoke out forcefully against
loopholes in the personal income tax by declaring: "It is high time
for Congress to quit this ludicrous business of dipping deeply into
great incomes with a sieve."2 Simons's metaphor of a "sieve" remains
highly descriptive of modern tax systems, which continue to embody
a myriad of special rates and provisions. While economists may
decry these features for normative reasons, they must also confront
the task of explaining their persistence in the face of repeated
attempts at tax reform. This can only be accomplished by taking
account of the simultaneous influences of political and economic
choices on tax systems.
We begin our argument by sketching a simple illustrative
model that includes both political and economic components. We
then consider the implications of the proposed framework for tax
reform if it is interpreted as a positive representation of reality. The
analysis suggests a different way of looking at change in the tax
system and yields some predictions about the nature and direction
of such change. Positive political economy does not preclude a
normative approach, however. We ask next: What implications does
an extended theoretical framework have for normative theories of
taxation? The question is examined in relation to equitable taxation,
the normative tradition that originated mainly in Henry Simons's
work and that formed the intellectual foundation for the Royal
Commission on Taxation.
2 H.C. Simons, Personal Income Taxation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1936)
at 219.
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II. AN ILLUSTRATIVE MODEL
The model of economic and political choice outlined in this
paper and developed in more detail elsewhere3 emphasizes several
elements essential for the analysis of taxation. Like most models in
economics, it is based on the concept of static equilibrium. Thig
allows interpretation of the tax system as an equilibrium outcome
and highlights the interdependence of different tax instruments.
The general-equilibrium nature of the model also makes it possible
to study change in exogenous factors and to analyze the
consequences of such change for tax policy.
A second key element concerns the treatment of individual
reactions to taxation. Taxpayers make economic and political
responses, both of which affect the government's use of policy
instruments. While economic adjustment or 'exit' has been much
discussed in the literature on taxation, political reactions or 'voice'
have not, so far, been integrated into the analysis. The model uses
the concept of stable political-cost or opposition functions associated
with different tax instruments to take account of both factors.
We assume that the political cost to the government of
taxing a particular individual depends on the resulting loss in full
income, including deadweight loss, weighted by the political
effectiveness or influence of the taxed individual. Political
effectiveness, in turn, will depend on factors such as the taste for
civic duty (voting behaviour), membership in interest groups and
wealth.
Consider a government that attempts to maximize the
number of votes expected in the next election.4  To achieve this
objective, it will have to minimize total political cost or opposition
in raising revenues for any budget of given size. In order to see the
implications of government behaviour for the treatment of taxpayers
3 W. Hettich & S.L. Winer, "A Positive Model of Fiscal Structure" (1984) 24 J. Pub.
Econ. 67; W. Hettich & S.L. Winer, "Economic and Political Foundations of Tax Structure"
(1988) Am. Econ. Rev., [forthcoming]; S.L. Winer & W. Hettich, "The Evolution of Revenue
Systems: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation" (1987) Carleton Economics Papers
87-104, Carleton University.
4 Some other similar objective would not alter the analysis in an essential way.
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and for tax structure, assume that there is a large number of
taxpayers, each of whom engages in several taxable activities.
Assume also that economic exit is possible in each activity. In its
attempt to minimize opposition by equalizing marginal political costs
across tax sources, the government will then tax all individuals and
all activities, using different rates across such taxpayers and activities.
The result is a complex tax system containing differentiated
treatment for each individual in every activity. While the
introduction of administration costs into the model leads to some
simplification in structure, the tax system remains highly complex
even when differentiation among taxpayers is costly to the
governments
Complex tax systems are thus the logical consequences of
heterogeneity in economic and political behaviour among taxpayers.
On the economic side, heterogeneity occurs in the ability of
taxpayers to adjust their behaviour and to escape into non-taxed
activities, such as leisure. On the political side, there are variations
in the taste for voting and political activity, in interest group
membership, in wealth, and in other politically relevant factors. In
response, governments in representative democracies create tax
systems looking much like the "sieve" deplored by Henry Simons.
The use of special features such as exemptions, exclusions,
deductions, credits, and variations in nominal rates, simply represents
an attempt by those seeking to stay in power to cope with
heterogeneous behaviour among affected voters.
]I. TAX REFORM IN A POSITIVE MODEL
As generally used, the term "reform" implies a change away
from the present situation in the direction of some desired standard.
In this section it has no such normative content but is employed
merely in a descriptive manner. We shall apply it to any substantive
change in the equilibrium structure of the tax system, regardless of
what form it takes or for what purpose it has been initiated.
5 Administration costs lead to grouping of taxpayers into tax bases and rate brackets.
For a formal derivation of this result, see "Economic and Political Foundations of Tax
Structure," supra, note 3.
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Because the literature on public finance has been
predominantly normative in character, economists have paid only
limited attention to the historical development of tax systems and
have only rarely tried to explain the changes that have occurred over
time. It may be useful to remind the reader briefly how extensive
some of these changes have been. During the first hundred years
of Canadian confederation, there were, for example, seventeen
instances where a new federal tax was introduced or an existing
federal tax was abolished. Established taxes fluctuated greatly in
relative importance. The federal corporate income tax, when
introduced in 1919, raised only 0.2 percent of total revenues: its
share rose to 11.3 percent by 1922 and to 30.9 percent by 1952,
falling back to 16.3 percent by 1967. Federal sales taxes, to take
another example, rose from an initial share in total revenues of 9.6
percent in 1921 to 29.7 percent in 1924, dropping back sharply to
4.7 percent in 1931. By 1938, their share had recovered to 26.5
percent, but fell back to 15.4 percent by the end of 1967.6
The theme of change is repeated if we look at more recent
history. Studies of Canadian federal budgets show that the Canadian
tax system undergoes continual adjustment.7 Between June, 1971
and April, 1980, federal ministers of finance proposed fifty-five major
tax revisions (each resulting in a change in revenues exceeding $100
million) and forty-eight less important ones. Since Canada has a
parliamentary system, these proposals were implemented with only
minor exceptions. One should note that the period above follows
an episode of major revision in Canadian tax law that was initiated
by the Royal Commission on Taxation. The numbers cited do not
include the "Carter reforms", but represent only subsequent changes.
Finally, a further indicator of change relates to underlying legal
documentation necessary for implementing tax policy. Currently,
according to R.D. Brown, the Canadian government turns out more
6 From unpublished data obtained from Irwin Gillespie.
7 W.I. Gillespie, In Search of Robin Hood (Montreal: C.D. Howe Research Institute,
1978); A. Doman, "'he Effects of Federal Budgetary Policies 1978-80 on the Distribution of
Income in Canada" (1980) 2 Can. Tax. 112.
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than a hundred pages of amendments to the Income Tax Act each
year.8
An extended theoretical framework, such as the illustrative
model, provides a new perspective for understanding the
transformation of tax systems. Continual change can be seen as the
logical outcome of the government's attempt to maximize votes and
to stay in power. Any shocks to the system create a need to adjust
the use of all revenue instruments and to re-establish equilibrium.
We may therefore expect to see continual reform from within; that
is, initiated by the government itself. Furthermore, such changes
will occur regardless of whether or not the tax system is judged
deficient with reference to normative standards.
An extended framework also suggests new questions for
research. One may ask, for example, what future reforms will be
likely to occur or how past changes can be explained as the outcome
of self-interested behaviour by government agents in response to
shifts in economic and political factors. Such work requires the
formulation of hypotheses on how exogenous factors influence the
nature of political cost functions associated with different tax
instruments, and how they cause shifts in such functions.9
While more extensive research on determinants of political
cost functions is needed, one can make some initial suggestions
about factors that may explain important changes in tax structures
that have occurred in the past. It is useful to distinguish between
changes in factors affecting mainly private economic responses, and
shifts in factors related primarily to political adjustments. Examples
of the former include changes in the age distribution, in labour
force participation, in the rate of inflation; and in the prices of
major imported commodities such as oil. Among shifts falling in the
latter category are changes in the cost of political organization, in
8 R.D. Brown, "Canada-U.S. Tax Issues: The Tax Treaty, Unitary Taxation, and the
Future" (1984) 32 Can. Tax J. 547 at 564.
9 For a presentation of hypotheses explaining differences among tax systems of U.S.
states, see "A Positive Model of Fiscal Structure," supra, note 3. Hypotheses dealing with the
historical evolution of the Canadian tax system are developed and tested in "The Evolution
of Revenue Systems: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation," supra, note 3.
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constitutional restrictions, in the cost of acquiring information, and
in political entrepreneurship.
One should note that alterations in the tax system that do
not correspond to changes in underlying factors create disequilibrium
situations, and are not likely to be sustained. Reforms in the United
States in the early 1980s may represent an illustration of this point.
When President Reagan assumed office, he instituted changes in the
corporate income tax that dramatically altered the balance between
revenues from corporate and from personal income taxation.
Apparently, underlying economic and political forces did not support
this shift. When the implications of accelerated depreciation and
investment tax credits became widely apparent, Congress re-balanced
the mix of personal and corporate taxes during the major tax reform
of 1986.
Although the theoretical discussion in Part II assumes that
the government has complete information on political cost or
opposition functions, in reality the government will have only limited
knowledge of such functions. This suggests that positive analysis
should also focus on the government's search for information as part
of the process of tax change. Gillespie 0 has argued that when
political cost functions are well-known to the government, changes
in the tax system are simply announced in the budget and passed
by the House of Commons without amendments. In cases where the
government is uncertain about political costs, it proceeds differently,
making use of mechanisms such as royal commissions or task forces,
or issuing white papers to stimulate discussion. Available
information may thus determine the agenda of debate, the process
of change, and some of the final outcome.
In summary, an extended framework interpreted in a positive
way leads to a different view of tax change. It suggests that reform
will be continual and that changes will involve several aspects of tax
structure at the same time, since re-establishment of political
equilibrium in response to disturbances will require a series of
related adjustments. It also draws attention to a long history of tax
changes that remains to be explained, rather than deplored as has
10 W.I. Gillespie, 'Birth, Growth and Death of Taxes: Financing the Canadian
Federation - The First Hundred Years" (Ottawa: Carleton University, 1985) [unpublished].
1988]
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often been the case in the literature. Finally, it suggests that we
should study the role of political institutions in shaping or changing
fiscal structure.
IV. EVALUATING NORMATIVE TAX THEORY
The illustrative model indicates that private political voice,
both of individuals and of groups, and self-interested behaviour by
the government, are all important determinants of equilibrium tax
structure. In this section, we explore the implications of this view
for equitable taxation (ET), the normative tradition underlying the
Royal Commission on Taxation.
ET blueprints favour simple, rather than complex, tax
structures and rules, rather than political discretion in tax policy.
The ET tradition of analysis derives primarily from the work of
Henry Simons, who had his philosophical roots in classical liberalism,
and who developed his approach to taxation as part of a broader
framework for economic policy.// Tax reform in the ET tradition
focuses on the creation of a comprehensive tax base where income
from all sources is treated the same, and taxable capacity is
measured by the change in net wealth plus consumption during an
appropriate accounting period. It is argued that such a base will
result in the equal treatment of taxpayers with the same ability to
pay, thus achieving the goal of horizontal equity. As a result,
proponents of ET are interested primarily in broadening the existing
base, and in eliminating special provisions, often called tax
expenditures.
To Simons, a comprehensive tax base was not merely a
means of creating horizontal equity. In his view, a 'liberal' society
required definite rules that were not subject to special interest
politics. He saw the comprehensiveness of the base (having a
function similar to a monetary rule) as a way of preventing the state
from using taxation as an instrument of electoral politics.
The flaws in Simons's argument, and in the ET tradition, stem
from the failure to develop an adequate theory of the political
11 W. Hettich, "Henry Simons on Taxation and the Economic System" (1979) 32 Nat. Tax
[VOL. 26 NO. 2
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process and of political rule-making. The Royal Commission on
Taxation Report,12 undoubtedly still the best ET blueprint and
probably the best blueprint in any normative tax tradition, reveals
this lack of understanding of political forces: "If equity were not a
vital concern, taxes would be unnecessary. The state could simply
commandeer what is needed. The burden of a reduced private
command over goods and services would then be borne by those
individuals and families who happen to be within easy reach of the
state."13  The argument suggests a rather curious view of the
constraints faced by democratic governments. Political opposition to
taxation, either by individuals or by special interest groups, is ignored
altogether. One may also ask how a mere concern with equity could
limit the actions of a government having the extensive powers
implied.
The implications of a comprehensive tax base and of
horizontal equity for tax structure can be illustrated with a simple
example. Let us assume that there are only two tax bases, B1 and
B2 , representing different components of income, such as wage
earnings and capital gains, and that the two components add up to
comprehensively defined income. Assume also that taxation is
proportional at rate t, and that each base includes one exemption,
s. Equal treatment of equals would then require that
S1/ 1 - S2IB2
and
tl =t2
where total tax payments from either base are given by
Ti = ti(Bi - s) ; i=1,2.
Unless these conditions are satisfied, taxpayers with equal
comprehensive incomes, drawn from the two sources in different
proportions, will not incur equal tax liabilities.
12 Canada, Royal Commission on Taxation, Report (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1966)
(Chair K.LeM. Carter) [hereinafter Report].
13 bdh, vol. 1 at 4.
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The same example can also be used to bring out a second
implication of ET theory. We can interpret B1 and B2 as referring to
comprehensive income and to some other possible base, such as sales
receipts for consumer goods. It will then be apparent that the ET
ideal can only be satisfied if taxation is restricted to B1, except in the
unlikely case where consumer expenditures make up the same
proportion of comprehensive income for all taxpayers in the same
economic circumstances.
There is no reason why a tax structure consistent with
political cost functions should satisfy these conditions. Political cost
functions associated with different components of comprehensive
income appear to vary widely in practice, with the result that income
from various sources is generally treated quite differently. In a
similar fashion, there is no political reason why the government
should restrict itself to taxing only income, or even to deriving a
sizable proportion of total revenues from income taxation. (There
are, for example, several states in the u.s. that have no income tax
at all.)
The extended model sketched in Part II implies that tax
reform will fail to achieve the objectives of ET unless political cost
functions are changed in just the right manner. The tax reform
literature in the ET tradition does not approach the problem in this
way, contenting itself with proposing changes in tax laws necessary
to implement the comprehensive base, or with suggesting changes
that would bring the existing base closer to the comprehensive one.
It should not be surprising, therefore, that such proposals are rarely
implemented in the form in which they are made. One should also
note that moves toward a comprehensive tax base may set off
political adjustments in the tax system as a whole that may reduce
rather than enhance horizontal equity.
How can we use the extended model to throw light on the
concepts of tax expenditures and of the tax expenditure budget often
associated with the theory of equitable taxation? Tax expenditures
equal revenues foregone from granting special treatment, and from
applying lower rates to selected components of income. In other
words, the existing situation is compared to a hypothetical tax system
that uses a comprehensive base and does not include any special
provisions or rates. The difference in revenues raised by the two
systems is then identified as total tax expenditures.
418 [VOL 26 No. 2
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Whenever we define a theoretical counterpart to the existing
situation, we face certain logical difficulties. In this instance, it is
not immediately clear what tax rates should be applied under the
hypothetical tax regime. One possibility is to assume that tax rates
on all components of income are set equal to the highest rate that
is presently observed (th*). In the context of our simple example,
with a single exemption on each base and proportional rates, this
implies the following definition:
El = R(Si = 0, ti = tn*) - R*(si, ti); i = 1,2
where E1 stands for total tax expenditures and where the expressions
R and R* on the right-hand side represent revenues collected in the
hypothetical and the actual situations. E, can be calculated as long
as we either disregard likely economic adjustments to the imposition
of the higher rate on all components of income (the procedure
generally adopted in so-called tax expenditure budgets), or estimate
R subject to predicted economic adjustments. While the second
course would determine the E1 consistent with economic equilibrium,
it would not ensure the existence of political equilibrium. There is
no reason why the government, in the face of given political cost
functions, should chose tn* as the solution to its problem of staying
in office. An alternative definition avoids this lack of reality:
-2 = R(si = 0, ti = te) - R*(Si, ti); i = 1,2
Where te represents the tax rate that would be chosen by a self-
interested government restricted to the use of a single proportional
tax rate for all components of income. Unfortunately, E2 can only
be determined if political cost functions are known; otherwise, it is
not feasible to predict te. While we can expect a lower total budget
if the government's objective function has to be maximized subject
to more severe constraints (that is, si = 0, ti = t), it will be difficult
if not impossible to predict the exact extent of the decrease.
The analysis indicates that the concept of tax expenditures is
theoretically unsatisfactory or, if redefined in the manner suggested,
largely non-operational. While it is generally understood that tax
expenditure budgets are of restricted value as long as they fail to
take account of general-equilibrium effects in the private economy,
1988]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
it is only rarely acknowledged that they also fall short because they
neglect readjustments in the political equilibrium underlying tax
structure.
V. CONCLUSION
The analysis in the preceding section suggests that ET remains
incomplete as a basis for tax reform, because it offers no guidance
on how to design and implement politically stable reforms. The same
criticism also applies to blueprints derived from other normative
traditions. Unless political cost functions change so as to be
consistent with a particular proposed tax system, that system will not
be adopted or implemented. Optimal taxation makes use of social
welfare functions to derive its results, but it does not concern itself
with the question of why any such function would ever be chosen as
the maximand by the government. The normative public choice
tradition, which we have elsewhere labelled fiscal exchange, suffers
from a similar limitation.14 Although writers in this tradition clearly
recognize the necessity for models of collective choice, they rarely
address themselves to the question of why a particular constitutional
change would be adopted in the existing political framework.
Furthermore, partial changes in political constraints, such as tax
limitations, can have unexpected results unless the substitutability
of instruments is taken explicitly into account.
Where does this leave us? Certainly, we want to avoid the
analytical trap pointed out by Agnar Sandmo. In his words: "If the
economist were to accept any kind of political constraint on the tax
system as a true constraint on economic policy, much of the
prescriptive power of welfare analysis would clearly be lost."15
Sandmo was speaking in the context of optimal taxation, but his
warning applies equally to other normative traditions. On the other
hand, as John Woolley has persuasively argued:
14 W. Hettich & S.L. Winer, 'Blueprints and Pathways: The Shifting Foundations of Tax
Reform" (1985) 28 Nat. Tax J. 423.
15 A- Sandmo, "Some Insights from the New Theory of Public Finance" (1984) 2
Empirica 111 at 116.
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Students of political economy make an error in defining their point of departure in
such a way that they rule out as illegitimate any political survival strategies. It is
analytically misleading ... to define the study of political economy in terms of some
supposed set of errors in economic policy that are then attributed to politics....
That is, by taking politics as bad compared to some ideal counterfactual policy, we
will always discover that policy has been corrupted by politics. Surely this
conclusion is no longer interesting.6
Is there a middle ground between these views? We would
suggest, first, that tax specialists should study the implications for
tax structure of particular political institutions. This is a prerequisite
to the understanding of why tax systems evolve as they do, and
therefore is a necessary step toward lasting tax reform. Of special
importance in this regard is the study of how the agenda for policy
discussion is set. Henry Simons believed that developing and
advocating a cohesive theoretical framework was enough to ensure
its eventual adoption. It is interesting to see how Simons's ideas
long after his death have been successful in controlling the agenda
within which the precise details of reform are discussed. This was
certainly the case in the most recent u.s. tax reform debate despite
the presence of advocates of optimal tax theory. But it is also
instructive to note the limits to this influence - the Royal
Commission's work and that of the u.s. Treasuy Report of 1984
notwithstanding.
Second, we should ask what institutions or institutional
reforms are required to support desired tax systems, whatever the
underlying normative tradition. Simons believed that ET theory was
consistent with political institutions that allowed maximum personal
freedom and initiative, but this belief was not substantiated by a
careful analysis of behaviour in the public sector.17 It may turn out,
of course, that some of the institutions most compatible with a
particular set of economic recommendations are undesirable on
broader philosophical grounds. But this would surely be an
1 6 J.T. Woolley, Monetary Politics: The Federal Reserve and the Politics of Monetary Policy
(Cambridge, New York. Cambridge University Press, 1984) at 184.
17 Simons's most prominent student interested in public sector analysis, James Buchanan,
comes to quite different conclusions. See G. Brennan & J.M. Buchanan, Power to Tax:
Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University
Press, 1980), for the argument that a comprehensive tax base results in excessive government.
1988]
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important conclusion, helping economists to realign their normative
assumptions with more general criteria of human welfare.
The emphasis on political economy in this paper does not
imply that analysts should neglect the more traditional study of how
taxes affect private behaviour and how they are shifted through
adjustments in private markets. Economists will continue to make
a major contribution by focusing on the impact of taxation on the
private sector. At the same time, a full understanding of tax policy
requires an extension of economic analysis to encompass the logic of
political action.
